INTRODUCTION
This article examines the tense, contradictory relationships among friendship, sovereignty, and sexuality-especially masochistic sexuality-in the poetry of Katherine Philips. Philips's more optimistic poems suggest that the union achieved in friendship undoes self-sovereignty, but only so that friends might assume other, more valuable sovereignties familiar to friendship discourse. Through their union, friends might free themselves from the limits of ordinary, bounded embodiment, from the desire for power, or from the sting of death. Yet these familiar sovereignties also enable a less familiar, more flexible erotic experience that is masochistic in that the speaker relinquishes the project of mastery for the sake of pleasure, potentially combining different forms of masochism in a salutary way. 1 Philips's poetic laments about friendship, in contrast with her more optimistic poems, explore dark sides of what it can mean for friends to be without self-sovereignty or without regard for it: to be subject to the friend's tyranny and to wish to subject the friend to one's own tyranny. In these poems, the speaker accesses masochism of rather a rigid and despairing sort.
Philips, I argue, does not resolve the contradiction that arises from her celebrations of and laments about friendship: friendship impels selves both to give up the desire for mastery and to be mastered by that desire. In preserving this contradiction the poems suggest that intense subjective incoherence and ambivalent desire are what friendship has to offer. Philips's poetry challenges us as readers to accept this incoherence, not to expect consistency or coherence in friendship, and so not to expect friendship to help resolve our inconsistencies. Accepting the challenge posed by Philips's poems entails not only reading about masochistic relations but also experiencing reading itself as a masochistic practice.
Merely to suggest that certain poems of Philips have a masochistic cast is far from original. Elaine Hobby, Elizabeth Susan Wahl, and Graham Hammill have all pointed out how, in different ways, Philips seems to derive pleasure from pain or at least from power relations in extremis. Hobby suggests that Philips "plays a sadomasochistic game, headily inside the role and yet never forgetting that it is just a pretence for the sake of the pleasure it brings." 2 Wahl, for her part, notes that Philips expresses eroticism "through the use of a courtly language of conquest, submission, and carnal pleasure." 3 Hammill, lastly, draws a distinction between the "Rosania" poems and the "Lucasia" poems, yet also shows how both involve erotic self-shattering; in the former, Philips portrays "a sovereign's tyrannical control over her population in order to illuminate a pleasure in self-destruction as the erotic experience of passionate friendship," while in the latter "it is no longer the tyrannical sovereign but the social drive itself that carries with it the sensation of death as aesthetic and erotic experience." 4 I follow Hammill most closely in emphasizing how we can find something like self-shattering-and not always just as a pretense-in both the more optimistic and the more pessimistic poems. Adapting Leo Bersani's famous remark that sexuality "could be thought of as a tautology for masochism," this article implies that, when we consider a range of Philips's poems, friendship could be thought of as a tautology for masochism too. 5 I extend Hammill's claims by attending closely to the forms that masochism takes, to the value that Philips attaches to giving up the desire for mastery, and to the value that I as a reader derive from a masochism not only practiced, but also to some extent confined, within poetry's virtual world.
I
To the extent that masochism-at least in a certain Freudian understanding-allows the self a lesser death in the form of self-shattering, some of Philips's friendship poems could not be called masochistic at all. 6 After all, some of those poems present friendship as what brings the self to life, not death. In "To My Before Lucasia, Orinda was an automaton. She did not live in a conscious, deliberative, or even self-directed way, and her hands were no more animated than those of a watch. Linking breathing and walking to sleeping in line 5 makes her death-in-life seem like sleepwalking-beyond her control, unconscious, and at best dimly remembered. We can be dead in a deep sense, Orinda suggests, and yet appear alive to everyone else, and possibly even to ourselves. In a Christian framework, humankind's general condition is death-in-life, being dead in sin until regeneration through God's grace. For Orinda, it is Lucasia, not God, who wields regenerative power. Orinda depends on her friend to have a soul and to live in a meaningful sense. Philips thus departs from the notion, evident in much early modern friendship discourse, that friendship requires an independent, self-sovereign "prerequisite self." Noting the Stoic strain in such discourse, Laurie Shannon writes that "[d]octrinally speaking, friendship's first figure is the self. Before it can be doubled it is required to be single, that is, autonomous and integral." 8 Not so in this poem. When the speaker gains a soul from Lucasia, she does not then gain self-sovereignty. One might expect line 4, which begins "I am not Thine," to end with "but my own." Instead, the line ends with "but Thee." Orinda cannot merely belong to Lucasia because belonging implies both relation and separation. For Orinda, friend-ship means identification, for her to be Lucasia. Lucasia is more than just Orinda's second self in a general sense; she is also her new self. For Orinda to gain a soul, then, is for her to lose a sense of herself as distinct from, let alone independent of, her friend. Friendship makes self-sovereignty impossible. 9 Lucasia gives life to Orinda in a way that moves her from one dependence to another, and if before she was indistinguishable from a mechanical object now she is indistinguishable from Lucasia as a subject.
At the same time, the poem's final third suggests that as friendship undoes self-sovereignty it also forms a corporate sovereignty, one that frees Lucasia and Orinda from the patriarchal, imperial, and possessive desires that structure ordinary earthly existence:
Nor Bridegroomes nor crown'd conqu'rour's mirth
To mine compar'd can be: They have but pieces of this Earth, I've all the world in thee. Then let our flame still light and shine, (And no bold feare controule) As inocent as our design, Immortall as our Soule.
(lines 17-24)
If friendship binds her indissolubly to the friend, then it also frees her from being bound to the world. Because Orinda possesses a world in friendship, she regards the outside world as of scant worth. If she depends on Lucasia for everything, and if Lucasia thus is all that she can prize-if she is her joy, life, and restthen Orinda need not look beyond friendship for anything. Carol Barash thus writes that while friendship as conceived by Philips might appear conventional and conservative in that it "provided a model of political loyalty," it also "poses explicit threats both to heterosexual marriage and to the very myth of political stability it initially figures." 10 In cultivating indifference to the world, Lucasia and Orinda's friendship in some measure becomes what C. S. Lewis claims that all friendships become when he writes, "Every real Friendship is a sort of secession, even a rebellion." 11 Philips's "To Mrs. Mary Awbrey at Parting" also gains its political purchase by distancing friendship from any intense form of self-shattering. The poem opens, though, with a contrary gesture, one that links friendship with the self's destruction. While friendship confers life in "To My Excellent Lucasia," parting from the friend in this poem threatens death:
I have examin'd, and do find, Of all that favour me, There's none I grieve to leave behind But only, only thee. To part with thee I needs must dye, Could parting separate thee and I. 12 Lines 1-4 imply that we can measure friendship partly by the grief that parting brings. Line 5 darkens the situation with the hyperbolic yet conventional suggestion that parting yields not only grief but also death. In a reading of Jacques Derrida, Jody Greene notes that friendship induces a specifically anticipatory relationship to death: "friendship always begins with the anticipation of the death of the friend" and thus "must be recognized as an exercise in preparing to mourn." 13 Line 5 exaggerates and literalizes this possibility that Greene and Derrida believe attends all friendship. Friendship for Philips is not only an exercise in preparing to mourn the friend but also, because of the agony produced by the mere idea of parting, an exercise in imagining and mourning her own death.
But the speaker abbreviates this exercise, for in line 6 the poem turns when Philips introduces a brighter possibility with the hypothetical "Could." What starts out as a hyperbolic lament over parting swiftly turns into an exploration of whether friends can ever be parted, a possibility that stanza 3 implicitly denies:
Our chang'd and mingled soules are growne To such acquaintance now, That if each would assume their owne, Alas! we know not how. We have each other so ingrost, That each is in the union lost.
(lines In order to feel the loss of the friend, Philips suggests, one must first feel self-propriety, the sense that one is a separable, bounded self. The speaker claims to have no idea how this would feel, for she also has no idea how she could disentangle herself from her friend. Physical parting no longer worries her; now the worry-un-serious here-is that she could not establish, if she ever wished to establish, a sense of herself as in any way autonomous. The speaker moves from concern about losing the friend to having "lost" herself in union with the friend. Having engrossed the friend and having been engrossed by the friend, both speaker and addressee disappear, incapable not only of being separated but also of even being located. In stanza 4 the speaker becomes even more assertive, declarative, and optimistic. Passivity becomes activity, and the despairing helplessness of the opening stanza is replaced by the certainty that they cannot help but be together:
And thus we can no absence know, Nor shall we be confin'd; Our active soules will dayly go To learne each other's mind. Nay, should we never meet to sence, Our soules would hold intelligence.
(lines [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] Given the impossibility of parting, it makes no difference that parting from Mary Aubrey would kill Orinda; these two "can no absence know," the negating sounds of "no" and "know" drawing absence into a sonic vacuum. 14 Friends cannot know absence because friendship confers freedom from confinement, allowing the active soul to range beyond the physical body. 15 Although friendly inextricability conjures images of enchainment, the chains are elastic and open, vessels for communicative ecstasies.
Lines 29-30 indicate that friendship's ecstasy involves sharing that is emotional and double edged: "But I shall weepe when thou dost grieve; / Nor can I dy whilst thou dost live." While friendship frees Philips from grief over separation, it does not free her from grief altogether, for when Aubrey grieves, so does the speaker-friendship's union demands this. But even as friends share grief, they also share life. Friendship allows and impels the souls of friends to travel back and forth between bodies, and in the travel they partake of each other's vitality. So long as her friend has a living body, Orinda cannot but live, as though friendship unites not only souls but also flesh and blood itself, as though the figure of friends' intertwined hearts is not really a figure. If in "To My Excellent Lucasia" friendship brings Orinda to life, here it prevents death.
Though much of what the speaker articulates thus far is quite conventional, in the poem's penultimate stanza the speaker attributes novelty to her relationship with Aubrey:
Thus our twin souls in one shall growe, And teach the World new love; Redeem the age and sex, and show A flame fate dares not move: And courting death to be our friend, Our lives together too shall end.
(lines 49-54)
In teaching the world new love, these friends will redeem not only the female sex but also the entire age. Redemption comes, it seems, through showing how love frees friends from any form of determination that might arise. Often-for instance in Philips's own "Friendships Mysterys," wherein Orinda asserts that she and Lucasia "were design'd t'agree"-friendship can feel so inevitable as to feel fated. 16 Here though, friendship frees itself from fate because it is determined by fate in no way whatsoever. If friends are free from fate, then they can appoint even their own deaths and can court death rather than the reverse. Friendship's sovereignty-the power that it grants friends over issues of life and death-seems without limit.
As in "To My Excellent Lucasia," this power of friendship counteracts patriarchal power. It does so in at least two senses. First, Philips defies the tradition-most glaringly apparent in the "Death and the Maiden" motif-that death is the last lover, that his ravishment awaits all women.
17 Second, as Hobby points out, negating the importance of physical separation forms part of Philips's attempt "to produce an image of female solidarity (and, perhaps, of lesbian love) that could be sustained within the tight constraints of marriage." 18 Husbands lose sovereignty over wives to the extent that freedom of movement can be virtual as well as actual, and that wives can leave home without even opening their doors. "Friendship's Mysterys" serves as a final example of Philips imagining friendship as conferring certain sovereignties that mitigate patriarchal power, even though the poem, unlike either "To My Excellent Lucasia" or "To Mrs. Mary Awbrey at Parting," celebrates a certain masochism. Though "Friendship's Mysterys" departs from these poems in its masochism, I argue that those poems enable this masochism.
In the fourth stanza of "Friendship's Mysterys," Orinda conceives of friendship in terms of a liberating captivity:
We court our own captivity, Then Thrones more great and innocent: 'Twere banishment to be set free, Since we weare fetters whose intent Not bondage is, but Ornament.
(lines [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] While in the first two poems Philips imagines friendship as freeing friends from ordinary kinds of confinement, in this stanza friendship constitutes an extraordinary kind of confinement-one not thrust upon friends but one that they actively seek or court. Thus to be set free from friendship's captivity would not yield any appealing freedom but would be a privation. The fetters that friends wear are ornamental and additive, helping to express the self more than limit it. Although stanza 4 draws captivity out of an oppositional relation to freedom, stanza 5 reconfigures that relation:
Divided Joys are tedious found, And griefs united easyer grow: We are our selves but by rebound, And all our titles shuffled so, Both Princes, and both subjects too.
(lines Friendship is limiting in that the friend's absence makes joys feel tedious; apart from the friend we are not fully ourselves and so not fully able to feel joy. Yet this limiting fact about friendshipthat "We are our selves but by rebound"-itself brings a certain freedom into being. "[B]ut by rebound" creates the sense not of a proper, delimited self but of a dynamic self bounding back and forth, freed from a stable identity. Friends in this poem cannot be what they are for someone such as Lewis, who writes of a "kingliness of Friendship" wherein friends "meet like sovereign princes of independent states." 19 For Philips, friends have doubled, shuffled identities: both are princes and both are subjects.
In this poem, like "To Mrs. Mary Awbrey at Parting" and very unlike Lewis's writings, friendship produces a union that disperses selves even as it fuses them. In the third stanza, Philips writes that
Here mixture is addition grown; We both diffuse, and both engrosse, And we, whose minds are so much one, Never, yet ever, are alone.
(lines 12-5)
Here Shannon's reading of Montaigne's famous essay on friendship is apposite, for in that reading friendship "suggests not only a baffling of distinguishability between the selves, but also a con-fusion, a co-founding of a new, double-bodied self fused in a seamless unit." 20 21 Philips, too, condenses these dilemmas in the image of friends as princes and subjects. While friends are free in the sense that they gain access to certain capacities and powers, they also have freed themselves from any unwavering desire for power. They willingly subject themselves to one another.
A more extreme form of willing subjection appears in the poem's final stanza, wherein the speaker clarifies what friendship can do with life and death:
Our hearts are mutuall victims lay'd, While they (such power in friendship ly's) Are Altars, Priests, and offerings made, And each heart which thus kindly dy's, Grows deathless by the sacrifice.
(lines 26-30)
Friendship's mutual victimhood-the sacrifice of hearts for which friendship calls-yields growth into deathlessness. We have seen in other poems how friendship offers freedom from death's impositions: from the death-in-life that characterizes friendless existence, from the limits imposed by embodied finitude and the fear of death, from the requirement that we die alone and on a day not of our choosing, and from the terrible fact that death is where sharing ends. In "Friendship's Mysterys," Philips goes still further, suggesting that friendship confers freedom from death altogether, even if she only defines this state by negation, leaving mysterious what life without death, yet with self-sacrifice, might be like. If the qualities of deathlessness remain mysterious, though, the political implications of the poem seem clear, particularly when we attend to its homoerotic qualities. The ornamental bondage, mutual victimhood, and shuffled titles involved in friendship arguably anticipate sadomasochistic role-play, and do so in a complicated way. Insofar as the shuffling of titles makes the game of friendship appear open, Philips's poem very much lends itself to Michel Foucault's sense of sadomasochism's productive potential: that it allows participants to play with power relations, endows the ostensibly submissive position with flexibility and reversibility, and enables players to play with subject positions by turning power relations into a kind of game. 22 Philips, likewise, posits that fetters allow the enfettered to free themselves from their given selves by shuffling titles, playing a game in which they change positions and identities without lasting consequences. 23 The poem's final stanza, however, complicates the stakes of its homoerotics and what it might mean for friendship to take on a specifically masochistic cast. The speaker has invoked outward ornament but, as we have seen, she ends with an inward turn: to hearts made victim. Unlike the body fettered merely ornamentally, the heart cannot cast off its bonds before being sacrificed. Friends' hearts are "mutuall," consensual victims, but the mutuality does not lessen the intensity of Philips's image. Now friendship allows not only the shuffling of identities, but also their radical remaking. The sacrifice of self into deathlessness is a happy shattering of the self, but a shattering nevertheless.
The poem registers no tension between the final stanza and earlier ones. One stanza looks forward to S/M games as Foucault understands them, to the willingness to engage in power relations playfully; the final stanza, very differently, looks forward to Bersani, who at points has praised masochism for the masochist's willingness to give up power for the sake of pleasure, to relinquish the project of mastery in order access self-shattering jouissance. Foucault values how S/M games render power relations flexible and reversible, how power can flow from both dominant and submissive positions. While aware of the conservative potential of S/M games, Bersani values how, in masochism, we momentarily lose our desire for power altogether. 24 Philips values both. In this, her poem merges masochism's more playful and more intense forms. Philips treats fetters as merely ornamental and unthreatening yet also as entirely binding. Through consent, freedom and bondage enter into indistinction such that friends, paradoxically, exist in a broad field of masochistic experience, capacious enough to accommodate not only sovereignty and subjection, but also playful self-fashioning and intense self-shattering. In "Friendship's Mysterys," masochism frees the self in this sense. The poem also frees masochism from a single form.
I have suggested that in "Friendship's Mysterys" Philips articulates a relation that she does not in "To Mrs. Mary Awbrey at Parting" or "To My Excellent Lucasia." Yet those poems, in two ways, help create a space in which masochistic practice might be salutary. First, and perhaps most obviously, they employ friendship as a bulwark against death and so remove some of the threats that masochism can entail, especially in the absence of a masochistic contract. Second, in eroding patriarchal structures, "To Mrs. Mary Awbrey at Parting" and "To My Excellent Lucasia" help ensure that female masochism does not become merely an expression of the feminine submission that patriarchy enjoins. That friends are both princes and subjects means that, at least in stanza 4, friends are not simply submissive. Moreover, insofar as friends are ever simply submissive-as, arguably, they are in the poem's final stanza-both are so, and so they hardly replicate the power structure, essential to the patriarchal imagination, in which one party is or ought to be active and the other passive.
Bersani himself, especially as his career developed, registered awareness of the risk that masochism might replicate the power structures it subverts. Certain celebrations of masochism, in his view, offer only "a rather facile, even irresponsible celebration of 'self-defeat'" and so "[m]asochism is not a viable alternative to mastery, either practically or theoretically." 25 If self-defeat defines masochism, then masochism "belongs to the same relational system, the same relational imagination, as the self's exercise of power," a system that sets subjects in antagonistic opposition. 26 The brilliance of the final stanza of "Friendship's Mysterys" is that it replaces simple self-defeat with mutual self-sacrifice and, in so doing, it belongs to a different relational imagination than that of power's exercise. The difficulty of the final stanza resides in discerning how its masochism would work outside the poem-let alone how it would work in concert with the masochism of the fifth stanza. Discerning this may be beyond possibility, and such a multifaceted masochism may only work within poetry's virtual world; indeed, to acknowledge this may comprise part of what it means to do what Kate Lilley says that readers ought to do in reading Philips: "take seriously the erotics of writing." 27 Still, the poem prompts readers to at least attempt to approximate the form of life offered by its lines.
II
Many of Philips's poems are hardly so hopeful about friendship as the poems discussed above. Often, Orinda focuses on the agonies involved when friends are severed or when she feels betrayed. With reason, Penelope Anderson has gone so far as to argue that "the dominant version of friendship" in the poems in fact "is not one of stability but of dissolution." 28 In "Injuria Amici," a poem that very much lends itself to Anderson's argument, the speaker conceives of friendship, liberty, and death in terms almost diametrically opposed to those considered so far. This opposition appears most starkly, perhaps, in the poem's final third, wherein friendship takes on a masochistic cast but yields a far from happy self-shattering. The poem reflects on the speaker's betrayal by a friend: Gone is the flexible relation of "Friendship's Mysterys," in which friends shuffled the titles of prince and subject. Now the friend and the friend alone is a sovereign, and not only a sovereign but also a tyrant: one who treats her subject arbitrarily instead of justly, and who responds to worship with violence instead of kindness. Yet if the friend responds in a way contrary to what the speaker might expect, the speaker responds contrary to what the reader might expect: she will adore the "Authour of my death, / And kiss the hand that robbs me of my breath." Freeing the friend from both her kindness and her revenge, the speaker implies that their future will be one of nonrelation, yet the poem ends in intimacy. Depending on the friend in other poems has brought strength, but here it leads to abjection of an exquisite, masochistic sort.
This masochism by and large forecloses possibilities rather than opening them. The poem certainly does not construct a situation like that imagined by Foucault: this is not an open game; the speaker cannot win, even if she kisses her torturer's hand, even if she makes it her pleasure that they disagree, for the torturer robs her of her breath. In one sense, the speaker's situation verges on what Bersani describes when he writes more positively of masochism; self-shattering becomes what Orinda wills, through which she will find a certain jouissance. In another sense, though, the speaker's situation differs radically from the masochistic situation as Bersani understands it. In Homos, for example, Bersani writes that "[p]sychoanalysis challenges us to imagine a nonsuicidal disappearance of the subject-or, in other terms, to dissociate masochism from the death drive." 30 Masochism here appeals as a way to relinquish control for the sake of pleasure, for the subject to give up possessive impulses and to disappear without facing annihilation. In "Injuria Amici," the speaker's masochism and her annihilation are not thought apart.
31
For these reasons, whatever freedom the speaker achieves through friendship is hardly as enabling, empowering, and protective as in the poems discussed earlier. Once, Philips had imagined that friendship might make friends sovereign over death, but now the friend, herself a tyrannical sovereign, deals out death. The speaker is free only to resist or to accept this death. At best, the speaker can establish volitional primacy, turning the injury inflicted upon her by the friend into what she wants and will embrace. The most she can do is to eroticize the disagreement that pains her and to kiss her pain's author.
In its embrace of simple self-defeat at a tyrant's hands, "Injuria Amici" certainly belongs to the relational imagination defined by power's exercise. Other poems also belong to this imagination. In "To Mrs. M. A. upon Absence," for instance, the friend's physical absence brings about death-in-life, a powerlessness that Orinda would desperately like to reverse. Absence, once nothing, now becomes everything, inducing a death that keeps the speaker ever so slightly alive:
'Tis now since I began to dy Foure moneths and more, yet gasping live; Wrapp'd up in sorrows doe I ly. 32 With the dramatically increased significance of physical absence comes a dramatically increased desire for physical possession. In the second stanza Philips clarifies just what she misses: not love but actual bodily presence. She expresses a longing from which, elsewhere, she claims to be completely free:
'Tis not thy love I feare to loose, That will in spight of absence hold; But 'tis the benefit and use Is lost, as in imprison'd Gold: Which though the summe be ne're so great, Enriches nothing but conceipt.
(lines 7-12)
The speaker of "To Mrs. Mary Awbrey at Parting" deems physical presence irrelevant, since friends' souls travel back and forth from one body to the other without limit. Here, imagining lack of physical access as anything but privation is mere conceit. Even more, friends not only must speak as subjects but also must be objects that can be touched and that could, like gold, be used to access other things. Otherwise friendship has no "benefit and use." It is a cliché of friendship discourse that only false friendships are essentially instrumental. While this cliché undergoes some challenge elsewhere in Philips, the poem's second stanza challenges the cliché radically. The friend ought to be at Orinda's disposal as a form of wealth. 33 If in "Injuria Amici" Orinda imagines a tyrannical friend sovereign over her, here she longs for perfect sovereignty over the friend. She knows, though, that she is not perfectly sovereign over Aubrey, but painfully subject to her, as for instance in the third stanza:
What angry star then governs me That I must feele a double smart? Pris'ner to fate as well as thee;
Kept from thy face, link'd to thy heart? Because my love all Love excells, Must my griefs have no parallels?
(lines In "To Mrs. Mary Awbrey at Parting," friendship links friends and frees them from fate. Here, the bond subjects the speaker to fate and to Aubrey alike. Philips here clarifies why she gasps in the poem's opening lines: though a link extends between friends, the two cannot move in step, kept as they are from one another's face. One imagines Orinda being jerked this way and that in an unintentional, uncoordinated, boundless sort of torture. Friendship's properties of boundlessness and being bound, elsewhere full of possibilities for pleasure, conversation, and joy, here appear as pitfalls and openings to pain, failing even to afford the masochistic jouissance of "Injuria Amici."
The poem finishes with a lament that tells us what the world now is for Orinda, as she enters into an intense sharing with the world:
Sapless and dead as winter here I now remaine, and all I see Coppys of my wild 'state appeare, But I am their epitomy. Love me no more! for I am grown Too dead and dull for thee to own.
(lines [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] While "To My Excellent Lucasia" asserts that friendship frees friends from the world and from worldly cares, here friendship's cares render the speaker more like the world. Orinda sees herself copied everywhere, "Sapless and dead as winter" after four months of separation. If the "wild 'state" that Orinda is and sees might suggest an excess or abundance of life, the poem ends by suggesting that to become like the world is to be emptied out and deadened. I have noted that late in his career Bersani became more skeptical of masochism's potential, and as he did he offered a relational imagination different from the one that he found in masochism. In this alternative way of relating, subjects become aesthetic subjects and in so doing form attachments founded not in difference and opposition, but in sameness and correspondence, an impersonal narcissism in which "[e]ach subject reoccurs differently everywhere." 34 Self-defeat, being dead as winter, becomes as tiresome for Orinda as it became for Bersani, but she finds only a nightmarish form of Bersani's alternative; she finds versions of herself everywhere, and while for Bersani to find this is to find love, for Orinda it is merely to find herself unlovable, and more miserable than ever.
Insofar as the "here" in which Orinda is sapless and dead as winter refers not only to Philips's world but also to the poem's virtual world, and insofar as separation has transformed Philips from her natural human form into an unnatural form from nature, we see the double-edged aspect of poetry's ability to achieve what cannot be realized outside art. 35 Whereas "Friendship's Mysterys" affords an erotic flexibility perhaps unachievable elsewhere, "To Mrs. M. A. upon Absence" affords inflexibility only, life-in-death beyond that of anyone who breathes.
CONCLUSION
Across a handful of Philips's poems, we encounter contradictions: poems in which Orinda willingly gives up the desire for power, and poems in which she seems defined by that desire. In one poem, art surpasses life by surpassing the ordinary relational imagination in which life is defined by struggles for power. In another poem, art presents an impoverished version of ordinary life at best, or an awful distortion of that life at worst. Much of Philips's poetry seems an exploration of what can exist only in art-what can be only approximated outside its virtual world. Given this, we are justified in wondering why some poems are bound by the relational imagination that structured Philips's social world, while others are not.
There are several sensible explanations for this double, contradictory aspect of Philips's poetry. We can, if we wish, explain it by attending to how the spiritual and the bodily operate, and we can focus-as Valerie Traub points out, much criticism does focus-on the "two poetic modes-Platonism and courtly lovewithin which Philips worked, or the two erotic stances-merger and aggression-authorized by these modes." 36 We might then conclude that Philips does not or could not, given the illicit nature of her desire, adjudicate between these modes coherently or even entirely explicitly. 37 Alternatively, we could attribute the divide in Orinda to the divide between the theory and the practice of friendship, as, in a sense, Hobby does. 38 We might, along these lines, wish to attribute the discrepancies between Philips's more hopeful poems and her more pessimistic ones to the circumstances in which the poems were written: that one poem was composed at parting, when she merely imagines what parting might be like, while another was written after Philips actually experienced absence at length that she did not will and could not control.
Both kinds of explanation offer considerable insight. Neither, however, fully accounts for the presence of masochism in both the more optimistic poems and the more despairing ones, or for the effect that such contradictory poems can have on readers: the vexatious virtual experience that Orinda has to offer. Lastly, neither fully considers what it would mean were the incoherence fully intentional, were it the case, for Philips, that friendship is inseparable from incoherence. Plato's Lysis ends with Socrates remarking that while we can know that friends exist, we cannot say what friendship is because we hold inconsistent, incompatible views about friendship. 39 Philips, like Socrates, entertains contradictory conceptions of friendship but, unlike Socrates, suggests that this is the experience of friendship: of contrary desires and intense internal division. Reading Philips's poetry makes me willing to accept this, to no longer demand or expect consistency of myself or of my friend.
Perhaps Philips is not so unusual in this regard. Of a certain understanding of love, Jean-Luc Nancy writes the following:
[L]ove is double, conflictual, or ambivalent: necessary and impossible, sweet and bitter, free and chained, spiritual and sensual, enlivening and mortal, lucid and blind, altruistic and egoistic. For all, these oppositional couples constitute the very structure and life of love, while at the same time, love carries out the resolution of these very oppositions, or surpasses them. Or more often, it simultaneously surpasses them and maintains them: in the realization of love, the subject of love is dead and alive, free and imprisoned, restored to the self and outside of the self … love is at once the promise of completion-but a promise always disappearing-and the threat of decomposition, always imminent. 40 This "double, conflictual, or ambivalent" quality, Nancy claims, "structures all occidental experience and expression of love." 41 However much Nancy's description of love might also describe Philips's account of friendship, his claim to universality-along with any claim one might like to make about Philips's own universality-would have to be hyperbolic. Jonathan Brody Kramnick writes, compellingly, that "[o]nce we pause to look, we see that the past's ways of wanting are not our own" and that the "language of human motivation and the practices of embodied intimacy have a different cast." 42 With respect to Philips in particular, we might pause over the incompatible masochisms that arise across the poems and recall that insofar as we can say that the poems involve masochism at all, it is a masochism before Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, and thus-to cite just one enabling condition-before the masochistic contract that can fabricate a stable, coherent, clearly demarcated ground for masochistic practice. Gilles Deleuze remarks that masochism, on account of its inherent volatility, "cannot do without a contract," one that "presupposes in principle the free consent of the contracting parties and determines between them a system of reciprocal rights and duties." 43 Philips, a married woman, lacks this contract, and in the poems-with friendship seemingly always on the verge of dissolution-it shows. 44 The ambivalent quality of the poems has much to do with the moments in which they were written and with the possibilities available to Philips as a female writer of the mid-seventeenth century.
All the same, the double love that Nancy finds "from the Grand Rhetoricians to Baudelaire" is undeniably quite like the double love in Philips. 45 To a great degree, contradiction seems to be what love is about: Orinda is made free by enchainment in one poem, and made unfree by it in another. She is dead, then alive, then dead yet alive. She is never more enlivened, nor made more mortal, than by friendship. Love gives her the promise of completion, and then the promise dissolves such that the threat of decomposition becomes imminent.
I want to end with a brief return to Lysis, and to how that exploration of friendship concludes. "[W]e owned ourselves vanquished," Socrates remarks, "and broke up the party. However, just as they were leaving, I managed to call out, Well, Lysis and Menexenus, we have made ourselves rather ridiculous today, I, an old man, and you children. For our hearers will carry away the report that though we conceive ourselves to be friends with each other-you see I class myself with you-we have not as yet been able to discover what we mean by a friend." 46 The dialogue has been spent in quest of a single, consistent definition of friendship, the sort of platitudinous form of friendship that Philips herself offers in some of her definitional poems, poems not discussed in this article. The quest of Lysis fails, and the failure vanquishes friends. Philips's poetry, though, suggests that friendship itselfin different ways and to different degrees-is what vanquishes friends. The extremes contained in her virtual world not only give us ideals of relinquished mastery to approximate, and nightmares of failed mastery of which to be wary; they also, by being extreme, make visible the fractures in friendship that might otherwise go unnoticed. For the sake of friendship Orinda gives up the desire for power, and in so doing she tastes friendship's fruit. Yet she also desperately desires power-to control her friend or at least to control friendship's terms-even as she knows this power to be elusive and to yield self-defeat.
Philips offers readers no lasting assurance that the impulse to give up power will win out over the desire for power. She does, though, show rewards that can arrive when one relinquishes the wish for mastery, and I would even venture to say that reading her poetry most satisfies when our reading practice, too, involves a masochism structured by a related relinquishing. When we give up the desire to master Philips and to gain a firm grasp of her sense of friendship-when we embrace the at times painful disorientation that comes with her competing visions-we share in the jouissance that her poems offer.
NOTES

